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Abstract
In a market system, regulations are designed to prevent or rectify market failures that inhibit
fair exchange, such as monopoly or transactions with hidden costs. Because regulations reduce
profits to those possessing unfair advantage, corporations (whether individuals, companies, or
other collective organizations) are motivated to influence regulators. Regulatory bodies created to
protect the market are instead co-opted to advance the interests of the corporations they are charged
to regulate. This wide-spread influence, known as “regulatory capture,” has been recognized
for over 100 years, and according to expectations of rational behavior, will exist wherever it is
in the mutual self-interest of corporations and regulators. Under the assumption of economic
rationality, a theoretical analysis suffices to determine where regulatory capture will occur. Here
we model the interaction between corporations and regulators using a new game theory framework
explicitly accounting for players’ mutual influence, and demonstrate the incentive for collusion.
Communication between corporations and regulators enables them to collude and split the resulting
profits. We identify when collusion is profitable for both parties. The intuitive results show
that capture occurs when the benefits to the corporation outweigh the costs to the regulator.
Under these conditions, the corporation can compensate the regulator for costs incurred and,
further, provide a profit to both parties. In the real world, benefits often far outweigh costs,
providing large incentives to collude and making capture likely even when strict rationality may
not apply. Regulatory capture is inhibited by decreasing the influence between parties through
strict separation, independent market knowledge and research by regulators, regulatory and market
transparency, regulatory accountability for market failures, widely distributed regulatory control,
and anti-corruption enforcement. We discuss the impact of integrity of the regulator in the analysis,
relaxing the rationality assumption. We also discuss various ways regulators themselves may seek
opportunities to benefit.
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The influence of corporations on government has been a concern of public leaders for
over 100 years [1] and is a central concern of protest movements today [2–4]. When public
interest is sacrificed to benefit a corporation (defined as an individual, company, or other col-
lective organization) due to that corporation’s influence on its regulators, the phenomenon
is known as regulatory capture [5–8]. The negative effects of regulatory capture have his-
torically been acknowledged by both policy makers and economists [5, 9–14], but the global
financial crisis beginning in 2007 crystalized the idea that regulatory failure can threaten
basic market function and the economy as a whole. The report of the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission concluded that the crisis was avoidable and that “widespread failures
in financial regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s
financial markets” [15]. Given the essential role of regulation, it is critical to understand
how capture causes regulatory failure, how widespread capture is, and how capture can be
prevented or mitigated.
Here we analyze regulatory capture using a novel game theory framework with two play-
ers, the corporation and the regulator. Game theory is used to analyze the choices of players
given payoffs that result from combinations of their actions. An essential aspect in our treat-
ment is allowing influence between the players, rather than using the common assumption of
independent players. Without communication, capture is not likely because the conditions,
threats, or payoffs of collusive agreements cannot be conveyed. We analyze capture and
identify its causes, conditions, and consequences. Economic rationality implies that when
incentives for capture are large, it can be expected to occur. By identifying when incentives
are large, we can identify with high certainty when capture affects regulatory decisions. Our
results show the most important condition for regulatory capture is that the benefit of cap-
ture to the corporation is larger than the cost of capture to the regulator (typically composed
of the risk of civil, criminal, and social penalties). When the benefit is much larger than the
cost, the corporation can easily compensate the regulator more than enough to outweigh
the cost, creating a profit for both the regulator and the corporation. In practice, corporate
benefits can easily run into the billions of dollars [16–18], whereas costs to the regulator rise
higher than the millions of dollars only in exceptional circumstances. Because of this large
discrepancy between the scale of benefits and the scale of costs, widespread capture can be
expected.
Among the conditions that reduce the likelihood of capture are: isolation of the regulators
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from the corporations (both at the time of regulatory oversight and over more extended
time frames), increased visibility of the consequences of regulations, increased visibility of
interactions between regulators and corporations, and widely distributed regulatory control.
Conversely, corporations and regulators have strong incentives to increase interactions; make
both market activities and regulatory actions more obscure and inaccessible; and centralize
oversight, reducing the number of people involved.
Framing the context for regulatory capture requires understanding why markets need
regulation in the first place—which is sometimes contested by those claiming that free mar-
kets are essentially self-optimizing and self-regulating [19]. Underlying this claim are the
premises that transactions are voluntary and that both immediate and long term conse-
quences of every transaction are known to the participants. In a complex world, there are
many causes for departures from these assumptions, including when transactions are not
truly voluntary, when consequences and costs are not or cannot be known, and when there
are important implications for anyone not immediately involved (externalities).
Economic theory and practice have demonstrated the benefits of markets for coordinat-
ing economic transactions [20–25]. However, undesirable outcomes such as monopoly, fraud,
and pollution can still occur within a market framework [26, 27]. As a result, consumers
face a variety of problems such as price-gouging, shoddy building construction, and the
deleterious health effects of pollution. Economists label these consequences the results of
market failure—such problems do not exist in ideal theoretical markets, but real markets
do not behave in the idealized fashion commonly described in economic theory [28]. Market
failures result from imperfect competition [29–31], information advantages [32–34] and infor-
mation imperfections [27], externalities, transaction and information costs, and suboptimal
equilibria [35].
Because of these problems, government or non-governmental organizations frequently
attempt to improve market function through policy and regulation [36]. To preserve the
constructive role of markets, such policies usually avoid directly mandating economic trans-
actions or prices, but instead attempt to restrict undesirable behavior, such as dumping
barrels of toxic waste [28]. Policy-making bodies may improve market outcomes over the
long run by establishing conditions closer to theoretical ideals, which include perfect infor-
mation, competition, and rationality; complete and private property rights; and negligible
transaction costs and externalities [37]. Some examples of regulation considered highly suc-
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cessful in U.S. history have been anti-trust regulation including the Sherman Antitrust, the
Clayton Antitrust, and the Federal Trade Commission Acts [38], enforced in part by the
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, and the Clean Air and Clean
Water Acts [39–41], enforced by the Environmental Protection Agency.
Given the presence of regulation, corporations have strong incentives to influence what
policies are implemented. Corporations may benefit from the existence of market imperfec-
tions as well as the presence or absence of specific rules [8, 10, 42]. When regulating bodies
are induced to favor specific market participants over the market as a whole, the purpose of
regulation–to promote optimal market function–is subverted, wholly or in part, resulting in
regulatory capture.
Captured regulators fail to enact or enforce equitable policies—and may go so far as
to actively protect the interests of their captors from other regulators—leaving the market
under-regulated or misregulated. Extant but ineffective regulation may conceal the damage,
making it difficult to address and resulting in conditions particularly harmful to society.
Opportunities for regulatory capture arise naturally from the way regulations develop.
When the U.S. government decides to regulate a market, it typically creates an agency
vested with the necessary power and responsibility, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Federal Communication Commission, the Food and Drug Administration,
or the Environmental Protection Agency. In order to support and protect well-functioning
markets, regulators require extensive market information, and communication between reg-
ulators and corporations is often considered necessary for this purpose [43]. These ongoing
interactions, however, also allow communication that reveals intended future actions and
facilitates agreements on reciprocity, leading to the kind of influence seen in collusion.
The key to characterizing regulatory capture is understanding the costs and benefits
to corporations and regulators, as well as the interactions between the two parties. The
benefit to the corporation from collusion is the difference between its financial outcome
under favorable and unfavorable regulatory regimes. The corporation’s profit is its benefit
less its cost, which is the amount the corporation must expend in order to influence the
regulator, for example by direct transfer. The regulator’s profit is the amount paid to it
by the corporation, less the costs the regulator faces for effecting biased regulation. In the
simplest case, by totaling the incentives of the corporation and the regulator and assuming
collusion will occur where profitable, a cost-benefit analysis indicates our primary conclusion
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that regulatory capture results from a high ratio of corporate benefits to regulator costs.
Regulatory capture typically requires decisions favorable to corporations from key indi-
viduals, including administrators and commissioners of regulatory agencies, and legislators
and executives passing laws. Financially motivated corporations may exert influence on
regulation in several ways. Illegal, direct bribes or threats can cause individual regulators
to compromise their opinions, as can legal, indirect favors for friends or relatives, donations
to political campaigns and valued causes, or richly compensated employment outside of
regulated contexts. Decisions can also be influenced by biased information (lobbying) that
reshapes the opinions of regulators or even those of the public; bringing to bear social pres-
sure to adopt a favorable world view; or by the appointment of favorably biased individuals
to powerful positions, arranged by influencing those able to make the appointments.
Counter to the incentives provided by corporations attempting to influence regulation,
regulators face moral considerations as well as the risk of exposure, with consequent criminal
liability, loss of public career prospects, and damaged personal and professional reputation
[44]. Most of the cost components are contingent on collusion being detected and exposed, so
it is reasonable to assume costs will increase with the increased risk of detection associated
with higher values and frequencies of transfers. It is also reasonable to assume a regulator
who frequently acts in the corporation’s interest is more likely to be detected and faces
higher costs than one who only does so occasionally. When detection risk is mitigated by
using indirect methods to accomplish the transfer—payments or jobs for relatives or friends,
contributions to a valued cause or political campaign—the benefit to the regulator must
be discounted appropriately. Many of the regulator’s costs are non-financial, such as social
pressure or moral consideration, but we may be able to incorporate their effects with an
appropriately adjusted financial proxy, simplifying the analysis to the single dimension of
financial cost.
Corporations can be expected to exert the greatest effort where incentives are greatest—
that is, where the most profit is at stake among the fewest parties [9]. Regulators can be
influenced through their desire for personal gain or their fear of harm to reputation or person
[45]. Previous regulatory capture models [6, 7] propose a wide range of factors that may be
influential, including the advantage gained by successful captors [46]; the impact of differen-
tial information across corporations, regulators, and the public [5, 47]; capture strategies of
monopolists versus those of competitive market participants [11, 48, 49]; effects of multiple
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regulators on the behavior of both corporations [50] and regulators themselves [51–53]; and
the “revolving doors” phenomenon, in which many regulators work for corporations before
or after their work as regulators [54–56].
We focus our attention on the importance of the interaction between regulators and
corporations, and our resulting analysis of the incentives describes a game where cooperation
arises from the mutual influence between the players—a “collusive game”. In order to make
the importance of interaction clear, consider the case where a regulator and a corporation do
not interact. Without interaction, the corporation assumes the regulator will behave strictly
in its own best interest and take a proffered bribe without bothering to bias the regulation.
Therefore, the corporation will not choose the useless cost of bribing. The regulator likewise
assumes the corporation will act strictly in its own best interest and not reward favoritism
with a kickback. Therefore the regulator will not choose the useless risk of biased regulation.
This aligns with the mathematically equivalent example of the prisoners’ dilemma, where
individuals choose non-cooperation because it is a superior choice in the short run regardless
of the other party’s decision. Non-cooperative game theory provides an analysis in which
each party makes a decision considering the best outcome for itself alone, resulting in the
Nash equilibrium of the game where neither party chooses to cooperate.
Various complications of the prisoners’ dilemma may alter the outcome. In iterated pris-
oners’ dilemma games, information about prior actions informs current actions and increases
the benefits accruing to actors that practice selective cooperation [57–60]. Other work sup-
ports the idea that communication, both direct and indirect, can have an important impact
on outcomes through reputational effects and reciprocity [61–63]. The importance of reci-
procity has been observed in empirical studies [63–66]. Important assessments of communi-
cation in game theory include the analysis of Mutually Assured Destruction [67] in which
various communications of one party influence the decisions of the other while engaged in
nuclear confrontation. In the real world, direct communication, indirect communication,
and continuing relationships between regulators and corporations are the norm. Rather
than employ the specific frameworks of iteration, reputation, or reciprocation, we consider
a mathematical framework that directly describes the influence between players.
Our treatment begins from the recognition that interactions between regulators and cor-
porations facilitate exchange of information about market function and provide opportuni-
ties for communication that violate the typical independence assumptions of non-cooperative
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game theory. In order to incorporate their effect, we characterize the extent to which one
party’s decisions affect those of the other party: when one party acts to benefit the other,
to what extent can it expect cooperation? We call this the degree of influence. When the
parties estimate that the degree of influence times the benefit of collusion is greater than
the cost of collusion, they expect gains from cooperation.
Our model is a two-player game structured as follows: in a certain regulatory process, the
corporation can gain a benefit, B, from one of two regulatory outcomes. The regulator faces
a cost, C, to choose the outcome that benefits the corporation. To influence the regulator,
the corporation can offer a transfer, t, which becomes a cost for the corporation and a benefit
for the regulator. The regulator allows the corporation a degree of influence, ∆, which is the
amount of increase in the probability of a favorably biased decision. The public’s influence
on the regulator is modeled implicitly by the regulator’s expected cost from collusion. The
central result of the analysis is that when the degree of influence times the corporation’s
benefit is larger than the transfer, which is in turn larger than the degree of influence times
the regulator’s cost, collusion makes both the corporation and the regulator better off and is
the optimal choice for both players in an ongoing relationship (see the Appendix for technical
details),
∆B > t > ∆C.. (1)
When the effective cost to the corporation of the regulatory influence, tc, is higher than
the benefits received by the regulator, tr, due to indirect costs and discounting of indirect
transfers, the inequalities separate to become ∆B > tc and tr > ∆C.
More generally, Figure (1) shows that as the difference rises between the corporation’s
benefit and the regulator’s cost, and as the degree of influence rises, so does the profit
available to colluders, and therefore the incentive for regulatory capture. The regulator and
corporation must negotiate the allocation of the resulting profits. To induce the regulator to
collude, the corporation must offer a transfer large enough to more than offset the regulator’s
cost. Beyond the regulator’s break-even point, the negotiation divides the profit between
the parties, whose interests are opposed. Although the exact profits for each party depend
on the split, total profit is a good measure of the combined incentives for collusion because
it is an upper bound on the profit available to either player.
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FIG. 1: A plot of colluders’ realized profit as a function of their potential benefit over varying
degrees of influence from 0.001 to 1.0. We normalize by colluders’ cost. This relationship is
linear, but we show it on a linear-log plot to emphasize that colluders’ benefits can accrue at
industrial scales while their costs are bounded by human scales. Because of this difference, benefits
grow dramatically larger than costs, driving large collusive profits and creating extremely strong
incentives for capture.
Regulatory capture may be partial rather than total, allowing influence over some but not
other decisions or swaying a decision partially but not fully in the corporation’s favor [68].
By considering the influence parameter, the model can also be used to assess partial influence
over regulatory decisions. Under conditions of partial influence, the expected value of costs
and therefore the minimum size for transfers are reduced, leading to possible collusion with
smaller benefits and transfers.
We may estimate the regulator’s cost, C, as
C = ∆(RA + I) (2)
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in terms of the amount of influence granted, ∆, the risk of detection, R, the regulator’s
personal assets at risk, both financial and social, A, and the personal integrity of the regula-
tor, I. This expression indicates cost increases with the amount of influence being granted,
the level of risk associated with collusion, the assets the regulator stands to lose, and the
regulator’s integrity. When the regulator acts in a strictly rational way, integrity is zero
and decisions are based strictly on the risk-reward assessment of economic benefits. As the
regulator’s level of integrity increases, the analysis departs from the strictly rational limit
and into a behavioral paradigm. At the level of approximation used in this expression, a
behavioral model can be converted to a rational model by adjusting the regulator’s cost—
increasing integrity increases the effective cost. For high levels of integrity, these costs can
become large enough to outweigh the benefits of collusion and impede regulatory capture.
Levels of integrity vary across individuals and cultures, and may reflect, for instance, the
structure of social loyalties and influences, the effects of public shaming [69–73], or the mag-
nitude of external threats [74]. For example, the Cold War era may be expected to have
given rise to higher levels of integrity in the US than the current one, where there is no
comparable external threat.
Risk, R, plays a key role in the regulator’s cost, and a major component of the risk is
the transparency of regulation and its effects. Since the costs of collusion increase with
the risk of detection, as it becomes clearer that a decision favors a corporation over the
public interest, the risk and thus cost rise for colluders. Advances in scientific knowledge
and literacy can improve regulatory outcomes by raising public knowledge of the effects of
regulation, making collusion easier to identify, increasing the risk of detection and thereby
the costs of collusive regulation.
The effects of transparency and moral principle can be illustrated by the distinction
between regulation of public health and regulation of finance. In a case of bacterial outbreak
in a grocery product, many deaths could result if the regulator conceals the problem and
protects the producer. During an outbreak of food-borne illness, there is high profile media
coverage and transparent effects. Such public exposure makes the risk of detection and thus
the difficulty of collusion high. The regulator faces the high moral cost of clear responsibility
for innocent deaths. Even though benefits to the corporation might be large, they may be
lower than the cost to the regulator. The regulator is thus unlikely to favor the corporation
and will act instead in the best interest of the public. In contrast, in a case of regulation of
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financial markets such as complex derivatives, the details of the case are often unintelligible
to the public. Even if regulations could be made transparent, they are often designed to
obscure instead. As we have seen from the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and speculation in
food commodity markets [75, 76], life and health repercussions from market imperfections
exist, but are obscured by cascading effects and time delays and thus poorly recognized.
Economic consequences may be inappropriately dismissed based on claims about the self-
regulatory function of markets [19]. This drastically reduces the costs to colluders from both
public pressure and perceived moral obligation.
Specific assumptions about the composition of the regulator’s cost do not affect the
function of our model, which takes the regulator’s costs in a particular circumstance as given
(exogenous). In the case of an agency or other body like Congress composed of multiple
individuals, the costs for the group are an appropriately defined aggregate of individual costs,
keeping in mind that voting bodies can be influenced through their least costly members.
In the real world, the benefits to corporations are often on industrial scales characteristic
of markets large enough to justify regulation, but costs to the regulator are on human scales
characteristic of individual salaries—as found, for example, in highly paid positions offered
by corporations to regulators after their regulatory tenure. Moreover, as the strength of the
financial incentive increases, the relative strength of non-financial considerations, including
ethics, declines. With benefits that are often greater than costs by orders of magnitude, the
incentives for regulatory capture are overwhelming.
A 2009 case study [16] documented the profits and expenditures of firms lobbying for the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which granted certain corporations the opportunity
for a large one-time tax benefit. The authors conservatively estimate firms spent a total
of $282.7 million lobbying for this bill and received $62.5 billion in tax savings from it,
a return on investment in excess of 220:1. The regulators’ cost is less than the transfer
from the corporations (i.e. the lobbying expenditure), and thus the “purchase price” of
favorable legislation is several orders of magnitude smaller than the benefits obtained. The
bill passed the House of Representatives with a vote of 280-141 [77] and the Senate with
a vote of 69-17 [78]. This amounts to more than $530,000 spent per member of Congress
(433 Representatives and 100 Senators) or $810,000 spent per favorable vote. The Speaker
of the House, the highest paid member of Congress, earned an annual salary of $223,500
and most representatives and senators earned salaries of $174,000 [79, 80]. While members
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of Congress did not receive the full amounts of the lobbying, these numbers demonstrate an
empirical upper bound on the amount needed to achieve substantial influence, which is on
the order of the regulators’ salaries.
Our quantitative model provides additional insights into real world regulation and reg-
ulatory capture. We note that regulators and corporations cooperate in order to generate
collusive profits, but compete over the potentially uneven share each ultimately obtains. Var-
ious cultures or contexts may determine differently how the benefits are allocated. Further,
the analysis shows a market for regulatory capture can arise in which regulators compete
to be captured in order to gain the associated benefits. Similarly, corporations can compete
to achieve influence and be the ones to benefit from a captured regulator. Moreover, while
it is commonly assumed that corporations are the driving force behind collusive relation-
ships with regulators and regulatory capture, there is similarly motivation for regulators
to seek such relationships. Regulators can incentivize corporations to provide benefits by
enacting regulations or pursuing spurious enforcement actions that are detrimental to the
corporation. Where there is no transparency, such actions can result in effective coercion
for companies to “play the game” even where they would not otherwise do so.
Agencies with poor transparency, revolving doors, few commissioners, and limited ac-
countability invite regulatory capture, and those standing to benefit from capture have
strong incentive to encourage such conditions. On the other hand, regulatory bodies that
avoid these pitfalls are more likely to achieve effective regulatory outcomes, especially by
creating life-long career prospects and an independent, research-oriented approach. Most
anti-corruption measures attempt to monitor direct transfers from corporations to regula-
tors, which are easily circumvented. Such efforts increase the costs to the corporation, tc,
relative to the benefits received by the regulators, tr, so the corporation pays more than the
regulator receives, tc > tr, but this depreciation is typically small compared to the overall
benefit of collusion and is unlikely to alter the outcome. For this reason, our analysis shows
direct transfers are an ineffective metric compared to the potential of monitoring corporate
benefitss gained through favorable regulatory change [81–84].
In many contexts, the recommended approach to protecting public interest is to isolate
regulatory agencies from “political” influence. This assumes elected officials, without expert
knowledge, will adopt harmful ideological objectives [6, 7, 68, 85]. Our analysis suggests that
isolation from politics is not effective in protecting the public interest, because corporate
12
capture of regulators is widespread and apolitical. Indeed, regulators who are less answerable
to the public may more readily adopt the views of corporate interests because they have
an indirect and tenuous connection the public and its interests. Political isolation fails to
address the primary drivers of regulatory capture: the interaction between regulators and
regulated industries and the incentive of large collusive profits.
Our analysis suggests regulatory capture is widespread, but the features identified above
indicate certain steps that can mitigate capture and protect the independence of regula-
tory decisions. One is isolating regulators from the industry they control by enhancing
the potential for lifelong regulatory careers and improving the information and expertise
independently possessed by regulators, so as to decrease the need for communication with
the industry. Another is increasing the transparency of regulation by promoting unbiased
research to analyze and clearly report the consequences of any regulation or deregulation.
Other approaches are helpful, but unlikely to have a large impact by themselves. Such
approaches include increasing the potential cost of capture to corporations by distribut-
ing control among more regulators and increasing the risk colluders bear by raising both
penalties and the rate of enforcement. Taken together, changes in regulatory practice may
meaningfully alter the payout structure of the collusive game played by corporations and
regulators, increasing cost, decreasing profit, and reducing incentive to collude.
In summary, our game theoretic analysis shows that when the expected benefit to the
corporation is greater than the expected cost to the regulator, the corporation can transfer
enough to the regulator to overcome the cost and create a profit for both parties, incentivizing
such action. Under these conditions capture is likely. While the benefits to corporations
may be publicly visible, the wide range of ways corporations can influence regulators are
not easily exposed. The expected profit also depends on the degree of influence, which may
result in partially modified statutes or favorable outcomes in some but not all decisions,
under the guise of a “compromise” or “moderate” regulatory position. Increased likelihood
of punishment raises the cost to the regulator, but this increase is often insufficient because
corporate benefits are on a vastly larger scale. Further, regulators are rarely held accountable
for inadequate or inappropriate regulation. Even when clear regulatory failures have come
to light, consequences for the regulators responsible have been negligible [86–90].
Where large differences exist between the benefits and costs of capture, increasing the
costs to regulators through various methods, including increased enforcement, is not likely to
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have a significant impact; widening the distribution of regulatory control increases effective
costs, but as the example of the American Jobs Creation Act shows, even hundreds of
regulators do not change the balance of incentives for large markets. In some cases, regulators
can be effectively isolated from interactions with corporations, but this requires vigilance
before and after, not merely during, the regulatory process. For effective regulation, it is
crucial to increase public visibility of the regulatory benefits accruing to corporations and
use these benefits to identify regulatory capture. Since the corporate benefits are much
larger than potential transfer payments to regulators, this signature of regulatory capture
should be more easily observed.
We thank Richard Cooper, Jeffrey Fuhrer, Casey Friedman, Yavni Bar-Yam, Julius Ade-
bayo, Karla Bertrand and Ramon Xulvi-Brunet for helpful comments on the manuscript.
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Appendix
We demonstrate the formation of collusion between the regulator and corporation using
a two-player model. We allow the regulator to choose a regulatory scheme that either favors
the corporation (F) at the cost of public interest, or does not favor the corporation and
preserves the public interest (NF). The corporation may either attempt to influence the
regulator (I) or not (NI). The cost to the regulator for favoring the corporation is C, the
benefit the corporation gains from a favorable regulatory scheme is B, and the size of the
transfer the corporation makes in its bid for influence is t. The payoff matrix is shown in
Table I.
Corporation
Not Influence (NI) Influence (I)
Not Favor 0 −t
Regulator (NF) 0 t
Favor B B − t
(F) −C t− C
TABLE I: Payoff table of profits for the corporation (upper right of each cell) and the regulator
(lower left of each cell) for each of four conditions resulting from combinations of actions by the
regulator to favor or not to favor the corporation, and the corporation to try to influence or not
to try to influence the regulator. B is the benefit to the corporation from regulatory favor, C
is the cost to the regulator of granting favor, and t represents the value of the transfer from the
corporation to the regulator in the attempt to influence regulatory action.
In a standard, non-cooperative game theory analysis, players are assumed to be inde-
pendent, and each player maximizes its own payoff given all possible actions of the other.
Under such assumptions (and provided B,C, t > 0) our model is equivalent to the Prisoners’
Dilemma. If the corporation does not attempt to influence (NI) the regulator, not favoring
the corporation (NF) is naturally preferable for the regulator, because it avoids the cost,
−C, of favoring (F) the corporation. If the corporation does attempt to influence (I) the
regulator, not favoring the corporation (NF) remains preferable for the regulator, since it
can obtain the advantage, +t, of the corporation’s decision without having to pay the cost,
−C, in return. This means not favoring the corporation (NF) is always preferable for the
regulator, regardless of the corporation’s action.
Similarly, if the regulator decides not to favor (NF) the corporation, the corporation
stands to gain nothing by attempting to influence (I) the regulator except to incur a loss,
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−t, so the corporation prefers not to influence (NI). If the regulator favors the corporation
(F), the corporation gains the benefit, +B, regardless of its own action, and attempting to
influence (I) would only impose a cost, −t, so the corporation still prefers not to attempt
to influence (NI). Thus, not attempting to influence (NI) is always the better strategy for
the corporation, regardless of the regulator’s action. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium of this
game is {NF, NI}: the regulator finds it is never beneficial but always costly to favor the
corporation (and so never does) and the corporation finds it is never beneficial but always
costly to attempt to influence the regulator (and so never does).
In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, as in our case, the Nash equilibrium is not the optimal payoff
condition for the players, either individually or collectively. The expected Nash equilibrium
outcome is not robust to modifications of the game such as iteration [57], which can instead
result in the collective (global) optimum. In our case, if the benefit to the corporation is
larger than the transfer and the transfer is in turn larger than the cost to the regulator,
B > t > C, the global optimum is collusion, where the regulator favors the corporation and
the corporation influences the regulator {F,I}.
In real world market conditions, cooperation is possible, and actions are not independent.
We assume communication and reputation effects exist which signal players’ willingness to
cooperate, and therefore the action of one player can be conditioned on the action of the
other. We formalize this cooperation by considering the regulator’s action to be contingent
on the corporation’s action according to a conditional probability matrix Px|y, where x is
the regulator’s action (F or NF), and y is the corporation’s action (I or NI). The conditional
probability Px|y is the probability of the regulator choosing action x given that the corpo-
ration chooses action y. Specifically, PF |I is the probability of the regulator favoring the
corporation given that the corporation attempts to influence the regulator, and PF |NI is the
probability of the regulator favoring the corporation when the corporation does not attempt
to influence the regulator. If the regulator acts independently, the two probabilities are the
same, indicating no influence. But if the attempt to influence has some positive effect, PF |I
is greater than PF |NI . We call the difference ∆ = PF |I − PF |NI the corporation’s degree
of influence on the regulator. Note that negative values are theoretically possible for ∆,
indicating the attempt to influence causes an adverse reaction (e.g. moral outrage). Since
the conditional probability satisfies the relationships
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PNF |I = 1− PF |I
PNF |NI = 1− PF |NI
(3)
PNF |I and PNF |NI need not be additionally specified.
The expected utilities for regulator and corporation are written in terms of the probability
the corporation attempts to influence, p
UR = −CPF |Ip− CPF |NI(1− p) + tp
= −C(∆− t
C
)p− CPF |NI
(4)
and
UC = BPF |Ip + BPF |NI(1− p)− tp
= B(∆− t
B
)p + BPF |NI .
(5)
Depending on the value of ∆ relative to t
C
and t
B
, the maximum value of the utilities are
at either p = 0, i.e. not attempting to influence is strictly preferred, or p = 1, i.e. attempting
to influence is strictly preferred. If ∆ > t
C
, the regulator’s utility function decreases with p,
and for ∆ < t
C
, it increases with p. In the latter case, effecting a transfer is favorable to the
regulator. If ∆ < t
B
, the corporation’s utility function decreases with p, and for ∆ > t
B
, it
increases with p. Thus, the transfer is beneficial to both the regulator and the corporation
if
t
B
< ∆ <
t
C
. (6)
For positive B,C, t, this is equivalent to the inequality
∆C < t < ∆B. (7)
Both sets of inequalities represent equivalent conditions for collusion. Inequality 6 shows the
range for the degree of influence that will generate cooperation given a fixed benefit, cost,
and transfer. Inequality 7 shows the range of transfer sizes that will generate cooperation
given fixed benefit, cost, and degree of influence. The threshold condition for collusion
is only satisfied when t < ∆B, reflecting the requirement that a corporation would not
provide a transfer larger than its realized benefit. Similarly, ∆C < t reflects the regulator’s
17
requirement that the payoff must be larger than the realized cost. Under these conditions,
both colluders will make a profit.
The sum of the corporation’s profit and the regulator’s profit is equal to the amount
of influence times the difference between the corporation’s benefit at full influence and the
regulator’s cost at full influence, ∆(B − C). The colluders split this profit by bargaining
over the size of the transfer, t, and the degree of influence, ∆. The regulator captures the
proportion of the profit given by t−∆C
∆(B−C) and the corporation captures the proportion given
by ∆B−t
∆(B−C) .
The corporation benefits from collusion when the degree of influence, ∆, is larger than the
ratio between the transfer and the benefits, t
B
, and in general wants the degree of influence
to be as large as possible compared to this ratio. The regulator benefits from collusion when
the transfer, t, more than compensates for the risk incurred by favoring the corporation, ∆C,
and prefers the difference between the transfer and the realized cost be as large as possible.
Examining these incentives shows that during profitable collusion, players still have opposed
interests in profit splitting. The split of profits is determined by both transfer size, t, and
degree of influence, ∆, with the regulator benefitting from a large transfer and small degree
of influence while the corporation benefits from a small transfer and large degree of influence.
When either the transfer size, t, or the degree of influence, ∆, is fixed, the other value
may be used to apportion the agreed split of profits. Bargaining over the transfer, t, affects
only the split of the profits, but bargaining over the degree of influence, ∆, also affects the
total profit available to split. This is because partial degrees of influence, 0 < ∆ < 1, lead
to colluders collectively capturing only part of the potential profit (∆B −∆C is maximized
at ∆ = 1 for B > C > 0).
In Fig. 2, we plot the size of the feasible range of ∆, which is the difference between
maximum and minimum degrees of influence leading to capture, as a function of the benefit
and cost, t
B
−min{ t
C
, 1}. We assume a fixed transfer value without loss of generality. This
represents a normalized measure of the aggregate profit accruing to colluders and thus their
aggregate incentives for collusion. In the red region the range is large and almost any
positive amount of influence, ∆, supports collusion. Therefore collusion is almost certainly
taking place when the benefit, B, and cost, C, fall in that region. In this region the cost
to the regulator is always offset by the transfer, C < t, and the regulator benefits from the
collusion even under full influence, ∆ = 1, so the regulator is always motivated to collude.
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FIG. 2: The feasibility of regulatory capture, measured by the difference between the maximum
and minimum degrees of influence leading to capture, min( tC , 1)− tB , given a constant size transfer
of t = 1. The larger the difference, the larger the colluders’ profit, and the stronger the incentive
for regulatory capture.
For corporations, the transfer is much smaller than the benefits gained as t
B
approaches
zero. In this region, a very small increased chance of favorable regulation—i.e. a very small
degree of influence, ∆—is sufficient to motivate the corporation to collude.
Outside the red domain, the degree of influence, ∆, has to satisfy more restrictive condi-
tions for collusion to occur. An interesting case occurs when the transfer is smaller than the
regulator’s cost, t < C. By only partially or occasionally acting in favor of the corporations,
the regulator can reduce the actual cost realized to less than the amount of the transfer,
∆C < t. If a regulator is making a series of distinct decisions, all of which affect the out-
come for the corporation, the regulator may favor the corporation with some decisions and
not with others. Under such partial influence, the risks and resulting costs to the regulator
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and benefits actually achieved by the corporation are reduced, but may allow the players to
reach mutually profitable collusion.
Finally, it is also possible to describe collusion as an influence market in which the regu-
lator dispenses (sells) influence, and the corporation seeks to buy it. The effective price of
influence is p = t
∆
. For collusion to be rational, this price has to be bounded by the benefits
and the costs,
C <
t
∆
< B. (8)
Thus, if the amount of transfer required to achieve influence is either larger than the benefit
the corporation stands to gain, B, or smaller than the cost the regulator must face, C,
the sale of influence will not occur. Using this interpretation we can consider a market in
which different regulators are competing. A regulator would strive to increase the degree of
influence, ∆, in order to make a sale. This is characteristic of regulators signaling that they
are easy to influence and attracting corporations. Similarly, corporations may compete to
be in a better position to influence regulators and thus have an increased opportunity to
buy.
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